




QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY:   
AN ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS  
AND LITIGANTS’ ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
ALISON LOTHES†
INTRODUCTION 
The recent rise of “sunshine” legislation, which prohibits or re-
duces secret settlements of civil lawsuits, highlights public unease with 
confidential settlements.  Recurring, highly publicized, dangerous 
events expose the costs of confidentiality:  the Bridgestone/Firestone 
tire scandal and the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal are the most 
recent.1  Litigation regarding the Dalkon Shield, the Ford Pinto, and 
 † B.A. 2001 Dartmouth College; J.D. candidate 2006 University of  Pennsylvania.  I 
am grateful to Professors Jason Johnston and Catherine Struve for their insightful ad-
vice throughout the process of developing this Comment.  I'd also like to thank Mi-
chael Ross, Morgan Taylor and the editors at the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view whose hard work was invaluable.  Lastly, I thank my family for their continuous 
support of my academic studies, in particular Edward Dabuzhsky for his unending en-
couragement, patience, and optimism. 
1 See Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 20, 22 
(noting that plaintiffs in recent lawsuits against Bridgestone and Catholic Church dio-
ceses contended that the defendants’ respective secret settlements perpetuated injuries 
resulting from product defects and sexual abuse); Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Courts’ Cloak 
of Secrecy Be Deadly?, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000, at 1B (finding that, in approving secret 
settlements with Firestone, judges subordinated the public interest in order to com-
pensate the injured plaintiffs); Michael McCauley, Court Secrecy Threatens Public Safety, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 6, 2001, at B-9 (condemning an estimated 100 secret 
settlements in the Ford Explorer/Bridgestone cases as contributing to 148 deaths and 
525 injuries due to tread separation).  Another example is the automobile industry’s 
tactic of secretly settling product liability cases.  See Anne Belli, Ford Resists Release of Es-
cort Documents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 1993, at 2F (chronicling a dispute over 
access to confidential settlement documents regarding an ignition system failure); 48 
Hours:  Hidden Danger?; Controversy Over Faulty Door Latches in Older GM Cars (CBS televi-
sion broadcast Dec. 12, 1996) (investigating General Motors’ (“GM”) repeated secret 
settlements of lawsuits regarding a door latch problem).  Secret settlements of lawsuits 
pertaining to human health are not limited to the automotive industry.  See, e.g., Mark 
Skertic, BP Amoco Cancer Payouts to Stay Secret, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at 1 (dis-
cussing BP Amoco’s secret financial settlements with plaintiffs claiming to have devel-
oped rare brain tumors from working in the company’s labs); Mark Skertic, In One 
Case, BP Amoco Settlement to Stay Secret, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at 12 (finding 
that the judge was unable to ensure that BP Amoco’s settlement remained public after 
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other consumer products or environmental toxins has brought to 
public attention cases of businesses keeping dangerous secrets.2  With 
the increased prevalence of state sunshine laws, it now seems that 
courts and the public have had enough. 
This topic typically engenders normative and theoretical discus-
sions of confidentiality in general.  Usually, authors try to determine 
whether the courts should be private dispute resolution centers or 
public truth-seeking services.  In this Comment, I will address these 
ideas as background in order to familiarize the reader with the basic 
arguments on both sides.  I will then discuss how the current regime 
governing confidential settlements of judicial discretion has failed to 
recognize and address the real problem underlying confidentiality 
provisions:  the divergence between societal and individual costs and 
benefits created by litigation.  In order to resolve the confidentiality 
debate, we need to understand the incentives of litigants and how 
confidentiality provisions affect those incentives in order to align 
them with societal goals. 
Currently, two competing frameworks predict the economic costs 
and benefits secret settlements generate for society.  These frame-
works generate opposite recommendations:  one suggests a regime al-
lowing confidential settlements will be more efficient, while the other 
suggests a regime restricting such settlements will be more efficient.  In 
this Comment, I will reconcile these two frameworks and argue that 
all open settlements are not created equal because of the different 
types of information they may contain.  The information contained in 
some open settlements provides the valuable benefits of deterring 
plaintiffs dropped charges).  For an extensive discussion of dangers posed to society by 
secret settlements, see the four-part series in The Washington Post, entitled “Public 
Courts, Private Justice”:  Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Court Secrecy Masks Safety Issues, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1988, at A1 (investigating GM’s legal tactic of using secret settle-
ments to withhold automobile safety information from the public); Elsa Walsh & Ben-
jamin Weiser, Hundreds of Cases Shrouded in Secrecy, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at A1 
(reporting the use of secrecy orders to conceal public safety hazards in a variety of in-
dustries); Benjamin Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Drug Firm’s Strategy:  Avoid Trial, Ask Secrecy, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1988, at A1 (detailing the public hazards of confidentiality 
agreements in the pharmaceutical industry); Benjamin Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Secret Fil-
ing, Settlement Hide Surgeon’s Record, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1988, at A1 (investigating the 
effects of secret settlements that prevent public disclosure of medical malpractice). 
2 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2624 n.27 (1995) (discussing an account that details the secret terms of the Dalkon 
Shield settlement); Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave, Note, A Plaintiff’s Lawyer’s 
Dilemma:  The Ethics of Entering a Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 
819 (2003) (stating that secret settlements delayed the public’s learning of, among 
other hazardous products, exploding gas tanks in the Ford Pinto). 
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wrongdoers and compensating victims, while other information tends 
to encourage nuisance suits.  Thus, by comparing how types of infor-
mation incentivize future litigants, I provide my own explanation of 
when society benefits from confidentiality.  Lastly, I apply my explana-
tion and conclusions to evaluate existing laws that prohibit physicians 
from confidentially settling malpractice suits.  While the debate on 
confidentiality provisions has focused primarily on how much sunshine 
is required, I will explain that the more appropriate question is what 
kind of sunshine is required. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Courts may sanction confidentiality in three ways:  protective or-
ders on discovery materials, sealing orders on court records, or confi-
dentiality provisions in settlement agreements.  I focus exclusively on 
confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements.  These are espe-
cially complicated because they are (1) private contractual agreements 
between the parties in which the court has a less significant role, and 
(2) final documents which terminate litigation and present significant 
cost savings to the courts. 
Secret settlements can occur in several ways.  First, the parties may 
come to an agreement during the litigation process and ask the judge 
to approve the settlement and its confidentiality, essentially creating a 
court order of secrecy.  Alternatively, the parties may make the secret 
settlement contingent on the plaintiff dismissing the lawsuit and 
dropping the case against the defendant.  In this scenario, the court 
generally has no control over the agreement, as the parties settle out 
of court. 
Settlement and confidentiality have their proponents and oppo-
nents.  I will summarize below the main advantages, disadvantages, 
and theoretical underpinnings of each school. 
A.  Anti-Confidentiality 
Against Settlement by Owen M. Fiss is the classic article condemning 
settlement.3  Although Fiss’s article focuses on settlements in general 
rather than confidentiality provisions, his criticisms are relevant to 
confidential settlements as well as open ones.  He argues that settle-
ments often involve imbalances of power between the negotiating par-
ties, and are thus a result of coercion rather than an exercise of free 
3 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
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will.4  Fiss argues that the imbalance of power forces the stereotypi-
cally poor plaintiff to settle because she is at an informational disad-
vantage, prefers accelerated payment (because a lesser, immediate set-
tlement payout may be worth more than a larger, delayed payout), 
and seeks to avoid litigation costs.5  In this view, since the confidential-
ity provision is part of the agreement, it is a result of a flawed process 
like any other portion of the agreement.  Such a process argument 
weighs against confidentiality. 
Fiss also claims that while litigation and court adjudication achieve 
the dual goals of justice and peace, settlement can only satisfy the lat-
ter.6  Referring to Brown v. Board of Education, he powerfully concludes 
that “[t]he settlement of a school suit might secure the peace, but not 
racial equality.”7  Adjudication, in his view, is critical to exposing 
tough issues and forcing society to be self-aware and self-critical.8  This 
argument is especially compelling in areas of civil rights and constitu-
tional law, where litigation can serve as a tool to develop and explicate 
the law. 
Confidentiality provisions pose additional problems beyond Fiss’s 
criticisms of the general settlement process, as the public may have an 
interest in the content of the litigation.  Open litigation has often di-
vulged health and safety hazards.  Conversely, secrecy threatens to 
perpetuate unexposed danger, imposing costs upon others who are 
unaware of that danger.9  Public access advocates argue that the pub-
4 See id. at 1076 (“[S]ettlement is also a function of the resources available to each 
party to finance the litigation, and those resources are frequently distributed un-
equally.”). 
5 Id.  But see Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence:  Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 286 (1998) (discussing blackmail as a potential result of 
power imbalances, indicating that the plaintiff may be in the position of greater power, 
extracting payment from the defendant by threatening disclosure).  For a discussion of 
the potential moral justification of blackmail, see Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary 
Theory of Blackmail:  Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 864 (1998) (discuss-
ing the example of “a gay rights organization [that] threatens to out a closeted gay 
Congressman unless he abandons his support for anti-gay legislation” as potentially 
morally justified blackmail). 
6 See Fiss, supra note 3, at 1085 (arguing that the courts’ “job is not to maximize 
the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give 
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution[;] . . . to 
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them”). 
7 Id. at 1085 (addressing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). 
8 See id. at 1086 (arguing that settlement allows society to “mask[] its basic contra-
dictions”). 
9 See Luban, supra note 2, at 2653 (summarizing the general problem of secret set-
tlements as “perpetuating avertable public hazards . . . by passing on costs to third par-
ties not at the table”). 
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lic has a right to information that divulges a risk to the public; the pri-
vate parties’ rights to confidentiality are subordinate to the public’s 
interest in safety.10
David Luban has refined Fiss’s position attacking settlements by 
stating that while some settlements are problematic,11 secret settle-
ments are especially so.12  Luban articulates Fiss’s arguments as a “pub-
lic life” perspective.13  Under this view, the court itself is a public insti-
tution, with a public-service function independent of being merely a 
“servant” of the parties in its courtroom:14  that function is typically to 
“give meaning to our public values.”15  Thus, if courts are “instruments 
of the public” and judges are “guardians of the public,” the court may 
have a duty to prevent a secret settlement that risks the health or wel-
fare of the public, or restricts vital public debate, regardless of the pri-
vate interests of the litigants.16  Such an expansive view of judicial 
function is central to the anti-confidentiality viewpoint. 
Ethical problems with confidentiality are not restricted to the 
court’s duties to the public.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers may face a dilemma 
when defendants’ lawyers propose a secret settlement that is lucrative 
for plaintiffs but potentially hazardous to the public.  In fact, plain-
10 See David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid 
Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (stating that secret 
settlements require the plaintiff to sell the public’s access rights to information that 
the plaintiff has no “legitimate right to sell,” nor any “legitimate property right”). 
11
See Luban, supra note 2, at 2647 (claiming that settlement can also fulfill values 
central to Fiss’s vision by contributing to “openness, political transparency, legal jus-
tice, and public-good creation”). 
12 See id. at 2648-49 (finding that openness is “at the core of democratic political 
morality” and that secret settlements are therefore “an unacceptable area of exceptions 
to democratic publicity”). 
13 See id. at 2633-35 (summarizing the public life conception, derived from the an-
cient Greek emphasis on political participation, as eventually coming to mean that “all 
adjudications are public in significance”). 
14 See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?  Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, 
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 
1527 (1994) (discussing the “meaning of courts as institutions” and noting that courts 
“are not ‘servants’ of the parties”). 
15 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword:  The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979); accord, Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent:  The Use and 
Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 296 
(1999) (describing the function of the court as a “vehicle for public discourse, for the 
explication of public values, and for the refinement or improvement of the law”); 
Luban, supra note 2, at 2634 (stating that the public life conception finds that laws re-
alize values in a “kind of public morality”). 
16 See Resnik, supra note 14, at 1527 (arguing that courts have a duty of account-
ability to the public). 
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tiffs’ lawyers have supported bans on confidential settlements in order 
to avoid this difficult ethical dilemma.17  As will be discussed below,18 
some legal experts propose an ethical rule prohibiting participation in 
any agreement that would restrict the availability of public informa-
tion implicating a substantial danger to public health or safety.19
B.  Pro-Confidentiality 
On the other hand, pro-confidentiality scholars emphasize the 
costs savings from settled cases and the importance of litigants’ rights 
to privacy and autonomy.  Arthur Miller and Richard Marcus are 
probably the most prominent advocates of secret settlements.20  While 
Fiss finds the negotiating process to be inherently flawed, pro-
settlement and pro-confidentiality scholars view settlement as a classic 
example of the freedom to contract.  These scholars argue that the 
litigant’s autonomy is not only an important right, but also a tradi-
tional tenet of our civil justice system.21  The “party-initiated, party-
centered, and party-controlled system regards litigant autonomy as a 
value in itself” and “‘installs preferences of the parties as the best 
measure of fairness available.’”22  In this school of thought, settlement 
itself is considered an individual right23 as well as the most efficient so-
lution to disputes.24
17 See Jean Hoefer Toal & Bratton Riley, The New Role of Secret Settlements in the South 
Carolina Justice System, 55 S.C. L. REV. 761, 768 (2004) (stating that the South Carolina 
Trial Lawyers’ Association supported a proposed rule restricting secrecy because “it 
would unshackle the plaintiff’s lawyer from being forced to sign a confidential settle-
ment agreement to honor his obligation to obtain a fair settlement on behalf of his 
client while cognizant that the document conceals a potential public harm”). 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 61-62. 
19 See Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must be Broadened, 
55 S.C. L. REV. 883 app. at 906 (2004) (proposing an ethics rule for South Carolina 
prohibiting a lawyer from participating in a settlement that would restrict public access 
to information that the lawyer reasonably believes implicates directly a substantial dan-
ger to public health or safety). 
20 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 457; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the 
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991). 
21 See Dore, supra note 15, at 297-98 (stating that the civil justice system was origi-
nally designed to grant parties maximum control over the litigation process, with 
minimal judicial interference). 
22 Id. at 298 (quoting Resnik, supra note 14, at 1539). 
23 This argument harkens back to Lochner-era protection of individual property 
rights.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  It is fairly clear that a negotiated set-
tlement is a contract, and that parties have a right to bargain in reaching a settlement 
agreement just as with any other agreement.  See Miller, supra note 20, at 486 (ac-
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In addition, Arthur Miller provides crucial arguments for protect-
ing confidentiality on account of the information content.  He em-
phatically contends that “[l]itigants do not give up their privacy rights 
simply because they have walked, voluntarily or involuntarily, through 
the courthouse door.”25  In his view, litigants have privacy rights and 
property rights in keeping certain information confidential; these 
rights are seriously threatened by the public’s compulsion for voyeur-
ism.26  Privacy and property rights may be valuable to both the indi-
vidual rights-possessor and society, as they incentivize efficient busi-
ness.27  Lastly, Miller questions the assumption that the types of 
confidential information at issue are likely to be directly relevant to 
public health and welfare concerns.28
Pro-confidentiality scholars restrict the judicial function to resolv-
ing private party disputes.  Luban describes the “problem-solving con-
ception” of the judicial function as one that is rooted in distrust of in-
terfering on behalf of the public interest.29  In sharp contrast to the 
“public-life” scholars,30 Richard Marcus argues vehemently that the 
court has no role in shaping public values.31  In addition, Miller also 
argues that the administrative branch may be better suited than the 
judicial branch to be a public watchdog.32  Thus, according to Miller 
knowledging that “a court should honor confidentialities that are bargained-for ele-
ments of settlement agreements”). 
24 Negotiation between parties is simply another form of efficient bargaining, ac-
cording to the famous theorem developed by Ronald Coase.  See generally R.H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
25 Miller, supra note 20, at 466. 
26 See id. at 466-74 (predicting that mandatory disclosure rules could threaten in-
dividual constitutional privacy rights as well as interfere with efficient and economically 
valuable property rights). 
27 See id. at 468 (referring to John Locke’s notion of property rights as incentives 
to productivity and critical to individual freedom, while recognizing their role in pro-
tecting innovation and competition). 
28 See id. at 478-82 (questioning whether confidentiality in the courts has become a 
scapegoat for information failures in our society). 
29 See Luban, supra note 2, at 2632-33 (concluding that the “problem-solving con-
ception” identifies “public” with “government,” places human freedom in the private 
sphere, and mistrusts government intervention). 
30 See supra Part I.A. 
31 See Marcus, supra note 20, at 469-70 (arguing that the courts were created to re-
solve disputes but not to “give expression to []public values[]”). 
32 See Miller, supra note 20, at 488 (noting that Congress has endowed federal 
regulatory agencies with quality control powers while judges may lack the scientific and 
technical expertise to assess complex health and safety matters).  But see Jack B. 
Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials:  Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 53, 58-59 (2000) 
(suggesting that executive agencies may not be sufficiently performing their assigned 
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and Marcus, public funding does not alter the court’s fundamental 
mission to serve private parties. 
Lastly, Miller reiterates the common argument that confidentiality 
preserves court resources by efficiently promoting settlement.33  Set-
tlement conserves court and party resources by allowing cooperative 
private solutions.  Several scholars have concluded that confidentiality 
is absolutely necessary to settlement in some cases, establishing that 
confidentiality itself may contribute to a conservation of judicial re-
sources.34  As will be explored extensively below,35 Miller also argues 
that confidential settlements prevent excessive nuisance suits, result-
ing in additional savings.36
C.  The Economic Rationale 
The above discussion, although not an exhaustive analysis of con-
fidential settlements, indicates the prevailing focus on the conflict be-
tween individual and public interests.  Steven Shavell’s powerful arti-
cle, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive 
To Use the Legal System, illustrates the root of the problem in economic 
terms:  the costs and benefits of the legal system to the private indi-
vidual and to the general public diverge.37  Shavell first notes that the 
societal costs of litigation, including to the court, judge, and defen-
dant, are collectively greater than the individual costs of litigation to 
the plaintiff.38  A plaintiff might naturally ignore social costs when de-
ciding to litigate, but her decision to litigate will inevitably impose sig-
regulatory functions and implying that settlement agreements provide transparency 
not available from federal agencies). 
33 See Miller, supra note 20, at 487-88 (noting that the court system is already over-
whelmed with more demands on its time than it can possibly handle, and should not 
be saddled with a “court-administered Freedom of Information Act”). 
34 See Luban, supra note 2, at 2656 (“Some settlements will break down if secrecy is 
unavailable . . . .”). 
35 See infra Part III.B. 
36 Miller, supra note 20, at 485 (“[C]onfidentiality ensures that the settlement 
amount will not be used to encourage the commencement of other lawsuits that never 
would have been brought or as unfair leverage to extract a similar payment in subse-
quent suits that may be meritless.”). 
37  26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997).  For further discussion of welfare economics and 
the incentives to litigate, see generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus 
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). 
38 Shavell, supra note 37, at 577-78.  Professor Patricia Danzon has noted this prob-
lem in medical malpractice cases, describing the costs imposed on the public, on other 
litigants waiting to be heard, and on the defendant.  PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE:  THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 192 (1985). 
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nificant costs on others.39  Thus, from a cost standpoint, there may be 
an excessive incentive to litigate because the plaintiff has only ac-
counted for her personal costs and not for all of the costs imposed on 
the general public.  Shavell also concludes that there is often no rela-
tion between a lawsuit’s social benefit and private benefit, as the plain-
tiff is usually driven by a need for compensation, but is unconcerned 
with the general social goals of deterrence.40  Therefore, it becomes 
obvious that the social costs and benefits of litigation will most likely 
not align with plaintiffs’ incentives.  Unfortunately, it is the plaintiff 
who ultimately decides whether to litigate or to settle.  Thus, depend-
ing on whether the plaintiff’s net benefit exceeds society’s net benefit, 
there will be an excessive or inadequate incentive to bring suit.41
Although Shavell’s theorem does not specifically address confi-
dentiality provisions, the application of the theorem to such provi-
sions leads to the belief that a confidentiality provision will typically 
have much greater individual benefit than social benefit.42  On one 
end of the spectrum, if the public has no interest in the topic of litiga-
tion, the public and individual interests align:  settlement is cheapest 
for the public and most lucrative for the plaintiff.  As the potential for 
deterrence grows, however, so does the social benefit arising from 
keeping the settlement open.  At the same time, defendants will have 
greater incentive to settle secretly, offering more money to the plain-
tiff to preserve defendants’ reputation and prevent further lawsuits.  
When “the plaintiff’s return from suit is less than its deterrent effect,” 
the plaintiff and defendant will likely prefer confidential settlement---
to society’s detriment.43  Thus, confidentiality provisions exacerbate 
the underlying problem of diverging costs and benefits when the de-
fendant is willing to pay more because the information would expose 
her to even greater liability. 
39 See Shavell, supra note 37, at 577-78 (explaining that when a plaintiff assesses the 
costs of her potential suit, she does not consider costs imposed on defendants and 
courts). 
40 Id. at 578. 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 5, at 332 (acknowledging that a plaintiff can extract 
payment for confidentiality). 
43 Shavell, supra note 37, at 578. 
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II.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO APPLYING SECRECY  
AND THEIR DOWNFALLS 
As illustrated above, confidentiality provisions present complex 
problems to the judicial system.  The public has an interest in settling 
disputes efficiently, maintaining the correct amount of litigation, and 
deterring wrongful conduct.  Meanwhile, private interests in compen-
sation and contractual autonomy are fundamental to our sense of jus-
tice.  Who should balance the public and private interests to decide 
whether confidentiality is appropriate in a particular situation?  There 
are several possible approaches, the most popular being judicial dis-
cretion exercised on a case-by-case basis, and the least popular being 
an ethical obligation on plaintiffs’ lawyers.  I will argue that the cur-
rent methods and proposals are not likely to succeed because they do 
not correctly address the underlying problem of diverging incentives. 
A.  Judicial Discretion 
There is no federal rule specifically addressing secret settlements.  
In general, federal judges may issue a protective order to restrict ac-
cess to documents if there is “good cause” and the parties’ interest in 
confidentiality outweighs any other harm.44  Many districts have their 
own local rules pertaining to confidential settlements.  Forty-nine dis-
tricts have local rules concerning sealing court records in civil cases, 
fourteen of which pose no limits to sealing.45  Of the remaining thirty-
two districts with local rules relevant to either the grounds for sealing 
or the duration of sealing, twelve require the judge to find “good 
cause” prior to sealing.46  Thus, a case-by-case judicial discretion rule 
seems to be the norm; parties can ask the court to seal the case, hiding 
it from public view, and leaving it up to the judge to decide.  Such re-
liance on judicial discretion has failed, as evidenced by the court-
condoned secret settlements regarding Catholic priests’ sexual abuse 
and Bridgestone/Firestone’s tire problem.47  In fact, some judges have 
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“[T]he court . . . may make any order which justice re-
quires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense . . . .”). 
45 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURT 2 (2004), http://www.fjc.gov (follow “Recent Publications” hyperlink, then 
“Sealed Settlement Agreements in Federal District Court” hyperlink). 
46 Id. 
47 See Neil, supra note 1, at 20, 22 (noting questions about the propriety of secret 
settlements involving Bridgestone/Firestone and the Catholic Church, which are seen 
by many as having sacrificed the public interest for the interests of private parties); see 
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admitted that they are extremely prone to rubber stamping any set-
tlement agreement in the interest of clearing their dockets.48
One particularly invidious type of private settlement is exempli-
fied by a Prozac case handled by Kentucky Judge John Potter.49  The 
plaintiff and defendant came to a secret agreement during trial:  in 
return for agreeing not to introduce damaging evidence, the plaintiff 
would be assured some amount of payment from the defendant, even 
if the jury found for the defendant.50  The agreement “assured the 
plaintiffs of at least X dollars while capping Lilly’s exposure at 
$1.75X . . . [and] was structured as it was so that Lilly would be able to 
point to a defense verdict as an exoneration of Prozac.”51  The agree-
ment worked:  the jury found Eli Lilly to be free from fault, which Eli 
Lilly happily broadcast to the public as proof of Prozac’s safety and ef-
fectiveness.52
The agreement reached in this case is a close corollary to “Mary 
Carter” agreements, where one contracting defendant assures a plain-
tiff payment, decreasing that defendant’s liability in proportion to a 
corresponding increase in a non-agreeing defendant’s liability.53  Mary 
also Walsh & Weiser, Hundreds of Cases Shrouded in Secrecy, supra note 1, at A1 (suggest-
ing that judges may ignore their duty to the public because they “have approved se-
crecy orders in lawsuits involving allegations of misconduct by doctors and lawyers, 
safety hazards in public facilities and products, and race and sex discrimination”). 
48 See Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court:  The Case 
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 712-13, 716, 729-30 (2004) (de-
tailing his own and other judges’ admissions that they have approved secret settle-
ments under pressure stemming from an extreme caseload); Luban, supra note 2, at 
2650 (concluding that among the two hundred sealed records cases between 1980 and 
1987 in Dallas County, one finds several examples of product defects that have affected 
public safety, including Dow Corning’s silicone breast implants, Ford and General Mo-
tors pickup trucks, and Upjohn’s sleeping pill Halcion); Richard A. Posner, What Do 
Judges and Justices Maximize?  (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
1, 1-7 (1993) (arguing that judges are not immune from reacting rationally to “ordi-
nary incentives,” such as docket pressure). 
49 See William H. Fortune, A Proposal to Require Lawyers to Disclose Information About 
Procedural Matters, 87 KY. L.J. 1099, 1101-05 (1999) (describing Judge Potter’s actions 
and citing Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) and Potter v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 926 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1996)). 
50 Id. at 1102. 
51 Id. 
52 See id. at 1105 (quoting press releases demonstrating the company’s use of the 
verdict as exoneration for the drug).  Ultimately, Judge Potter pursued his suspicions 
that the judgment did not “accurately reflect the truth,” and moved sua sponte to cor-
rect the judgment, ultimately appealing to the Kentucky Supreme Court.  Id. at 1107 
(citing Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 453). 
53 “Mary Carter” agreements earned their name from the seminal case in which 
such a deal was brokered, Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
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Carter agreements suggest that judges are not able to adequately con-
trol secret settlements in their courtrooms, much less those that never 
reach the courtroom. 
To address these many invidious triggers of confidentiality, a few 
states have enacted “sunshine” reforms which create a statutory pre-
sumption of openness.54  Florida passed the first such reform in 1990 
with the Sunshine in Litigation Act, providing that confidential 
agreements which conceal a public hazard or information relating to 
a public hazard may not be enforced because they are contrary to 
public policy.55  Texas passed reforms in 1990 as well, establishing 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76(a), which states that court records 
are presumed to be open to the general public and allows them to be 
sealed in only limited circumstances.56  Arkansas, Washington, and 
Louisiana have also passed some type of settlement reform.57
These reforms have not solved the problem.  In some cases, sub-
sequent judicial interpretation of the reform statute has weakened the 
law.58  Broadly, the crux of the issue is that, regardless of whether the 
presumption is for openness or confidentiality, the laws are always 
prone to judicial discretion in application; judges can still allow se-
crecy when they see fit.   
Finally, an unresolved problem remains:  secret settlements outside 
of the courtroom may be made without any court scrutiny.59  Private se-
1967).  See Fortune, supra note 49, at 1121 (discussing the confusion that Mary Carter 
agreements cause regarding parties’ true intentions); see also id. at 1121 n.140 (citing 
numerous sources that discuss Mary Carter agreements). 
54 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 45, at 5 (summarizing state statutes and rules 
regarding the confidentiality of court proceedings). 
55 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West 2004). 
56 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76(a). 
57 See Zitrin, supra note 19, at 893-95 (referring to, inter alia, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
55-122 (Supp. 2003), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611 (West Supp. 2004), and LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (Supp. 2004)). 
58 See id. at 891 (“Unfortunately, the application of these rules and statutes has 
been undercut, sometimes severely, . . . by subsequent court decisions interpreting the 
regulation.”). 
59 See Dore, supra note 15, at 387 (finding that even in the face of sunshine laws, 
“litigants generally possess wide latitude to contract for settlement confidentiality” be-
cause they can simply file a stipulation of dismissal with the court and sign a private 
agreement); see also Garfield, supra note 5, at 263-67 (arguing that contracts of si-
lence—private contracts entirely outside the courts requiring confidentiality—have 
been largely unregulated and untouched by precedent).  California has tried to ad-
dress contracts of silence through several bills, but none has passed.  See, e.g., S.B. 11, 
2000 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (attempting to legislate against contracts of silence); 
Assemb. B. 36, 2001 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (same).  See generally Michael 
K. Brown & Lisa M. Baird, Business’ Privacy and Property Rights Threatened in California, 
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cret settlements might occur before the suit is even filed.  Such agree-
ments are prone to the same problems as court-sanctioned ones:  they 
suppress information about harmful products, criminal or tortious 
conduct, or other dangers to public safety.60
B.  Lawyers Decide 
Another option is for the lawyers involved to regulate secret set-
tlements by refusing to engage in negotiations or to represent their 
client in signing the agreement.  This option has been advocated by 
legal ethicist Richard Zitrin and other ethicists who ask lawyers to in-
state a high ethical standard of behavior.61  Zitrin has been the most 
outspoken advocate of this approach, formulating a model ethics rule 
prohibiting lawyers from signing agreements that harm third parties.62  
This rule is targeted and specific to the problem:  confidentiality is not 
per se outlawed, but rather is only prohibited when the lawyer rea-
sonably believes the information could be relevant to others’ safety.63  
Such a rule would require lawyers to disclose the policy to their client 
at the outset of their representation. 
Others have also endorsed the notion that lawyers should help 
regulate secret settlements, proposing that “attorneys have an obliga-
tion to reveal any secret arrangement which alters the positions of the 
parties.”64  Although this argument emphasizes the judge’s need for 
an honest understanding of the litigants’ positions rather than pre-
venting harm to third parties, the basic foundation of the position is 
the same:  an ethical obligation gives the lawyer “an excuse to do the 
right thing.”65
Some argue that the duty of “zealous advocacy” inherently prohib-
its the lawyer from interfering with the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 23, 2001, at 1, 2-4 (arguing that such bills are egregious 
and unnecessary infringements on privacy and property rights). 
60 See Garfield, supra note 5, at 275 (analyzing the legal basis and criticism against 
“contracts of silence”). 
61 See Zitrin, supra note 19, at 904 (arguing that rules of professional ethics should 
supplement court rules and statutes governing secret agreements); see also RICHARD 
ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 183-
208 (1999) (citing a number of products liability cases in which lawyers were uniquely 
positioned to prevent public harm). 
62 Zitrin, supra note 19, at 905-06. 
63 Id. 
64 Fortune, supra note 49, at 1121. 
65 Id. at 1123. 
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a lucrative settlement.66  Furthermore, a lawyer has her own interests 
at stake as well:  lawyers who operate with a contingency fee may be 
biased in favor of settlement.  Nonetheless, given the present nature 
of the legal system, it appears that lawyers, in fact, may be in the best 
position to regulate secret agreements.  Scholars have noted that the 
public trial is no longer the focus of our justice system.67  As only four 
percent of all filed civil cases now proceed to trial, it appears that our 
judicial system’s focus has shifted from trial litigation to pretrial nego-
tiation.68  Accordingly, the process seems to be less judge-centered 
and more lawyer-centered.69  It seems appropriate, therefore, to rest 
the burden of regulating secret settlements on those most involved 
with the negotiation:  the lawyers.  This could also help to solve the 
problem of private secret settlements, which would still require an at-
torney, even if they are outside the judge’s purview. 
Although ethical regulations are laudable and potentially effective 
(at least in part), they are not enthusiastically endorsed.70  Several 
scholars claim that a lawyer has a duty to her client only; any ethical 
66 See David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 
125, 128 (1999) (arguing that Zitrin’s proposed ethical rule prevents lawyers from 
compassionately advocating for their clients, encourages clients to make an “end-run” 
around the lawyers, and creates an incentive for lawyers to negotiate the settlement 
early in the process, before it is possible to form a “reasonable belief” that “public 
health or safety” is in peril).  But see Luban, supra note 2, at 2624 (noting that “[t]he 
public-good character of attorney skills” has been acknowledged in professional ethics 
codes, which restrict lawyer-buyout agreements). 
67 See Dore, supra note 15, at 288 (noting that decisions on the merits are becom-
ing increasingly rare as pretrial motions, discovery, and settlement negotiations absorb 
most of a typical lawyer’s and court’s time and resources). 
68 Id.; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”:  Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-42 (1994) (arguing that settle-
ments have become the dominant method of case resolution and should be assessed 
with a critical eye as a result). 
69 See Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 631, 632-39, 646-48 (examining the dramatic reforms in civil procedure, 
which greatly increased pre-trial options and therefore shifted the power balance from 
judges to lawyers).  Adversarial systems may be more prone to be lawyer-centered with 
a strict division of pre-trial and trial procedure, whereas the civil law system is more 
judge-centered with a continuous trial process.  For a comparative discussion of the 
two, see generally John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985), which argues that the shortcomings of the American adversar-
ial system are addressed by the civil law system of Germany. 
70 See Dana & Koniak, supra note 10, at 1217 n.1 (reporting that the Ethics 2000 
Commission rejected such regulations because state legislatures are better equipped 
for such changes, and the ethical regulations of lawyers would put pro se parties at an 
advantage).  The authors, however, go on to dispute the reasoning of the Commission 
and to argue that both ethics rules and criminal and civil laws ought to curtail harmful 
secret settlements.  Id. at 1226-41. 
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regulations that create a duty to the public are thus conflicts of inter-
est.71  The lawyer’s obligation to act in the best interests of her client 
may be best fulfilled by a secret settlement.  Even Luban, who has 
powerfully condemned secret settlements, acknowledges that “secret 
settlements may be the only way that a weak plaintiff who has suffered 
serious harm can obtain compensation.”72  Secret settlements may cost 
others (the public and subsequent plaintiffs), but the lawyer can reply 
that she must defend her client’s right to compensation.  In sum, an 
ethical obligation is a good start, but will not solve the problem en-
tirely. 
C.  Comparison 
Neither the judge-centered nor the lawyer-centered approach to 
regulating secret settlements is workable.  The incentives in each case 
do not align.  Judges have incentives to reduce their caseload, favoring 
settlements of cases before them.  Further, judges have incentives to 
dismiss a suit and allow parties to settle out of court, beyond the con-
trol of the judge.  Meanwhile, a lawyer’s incentives are aligned with 
her client’s.  In addition, asking the plaintiff to forego a lucrative set-
tlement is difficult and many lawyers would object to such an obliga-
tion.  Furthermore, secrecy has direct consequences for the lawyer’s 
practice, as the lawyer could be prohibited from representing a client 
in a suit against the same defendant in the future.73  Thus, although 
an ethical obligation could be at least somewhat effective, it is hard to 
impose it upon the American adversarial legal system. 
Solving this problem therefore requires state legislatures to ad-
dress the litigants’ incentives, rather than relying on either judges or 
lawyers to regulate themselves by pushing against their personal inter-
71 See Luban, supra note 2, at 2624-25 (stating that lawyers’ professional ethics 
codes generally find that “a lawyer who fails to maximize a client’s outcome out of con-
cern for future clients is guilty of a conflict of interest”).  One interesting exception to 
the general rule of zealous advocacy is ethical prohibitions on lawyer-buyout agree-
ments, indicating that lawyers do have a duty to the general public.  See id. (finding, in 
the presence of such prohibitions, a sense that attorney skills become a public good); 
Dana & Koniak, supra note 10, at 1218-19 (condemning lawyer-buyout agreements as 
an impermissible usurpation by the plaintiff of the lawyer’s rights). 
72 Luban, supra note 2, at 2657. 
73 See Dana and Koniak, supra note 10, at 1218-19 (asserting that the law should 
curtail secret settlements and future-practice restrictions, given the “anticompetitive 
effects” of such practices on the legal market). 
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ests.74  Restricting confidential settlements should not be a result of 
judges’ case-by-case determinations or lawyers’ ethical obligations.  In-
stead, we need to create legislation which is tailored to litigants’ in-
centives and matches the public interest.75  Optimally, we need to cre-
ate a regime that generates enough openness to meet the twin goals 
of compensation and deterrence, while reserving a level of confidenti-
ality that protects defendants’ and plaintiffs’ rights. 
Generally speaking, society benefits by promoting litigation that 
furthers the goals of tort deterrence and just compensation.  Accord-
ingly, the public may have an interest in only certain types of litiga-
tion:  those where non-party citizens were harmed or threatened to be 
harmed by the defendants’ conduct.  Certain industries, such as those 
involving mass consumer products, healthcare, and transportation, 
are areas in which litigation is more efficient than settlement because 
society has a greater interest in deterrence and compensation in these 
cases.  Other areas, such as family law, are generally more appropriate 
for confidential settlements.  Combining Shavell’s economic analysis, 
explained in Part II.C, with the practical analysis in this Part suggests a 
possible solution of restricting confidentiality in targeted areas, while 
preserving the possibility of confidentiality for the majority of litigants.   
III.  ECONOMIC MODELS AND LITIGANTS’ INCENTIVES 
In this Part, I will consider what kind of legislation provides the 
proper incentives to litigants.  I will compare two economic frame-
works, each consisting of multiple models that analyze litigant incen-
tives regarding confidential settlements and litigation.  The first 
framework supports an open regime (one which would prohibit con-
fidential settlements), while the second framework supports litigant 
autonomy and the right to secrecy.  After analyzing each framework, I 
will offer a resolution to the conflict between them. 
74 This approach will side-step the issue of judicial discretion, discussed supra, Part 
II.A, by removing the judge’s role in prohibiting or allowing confidential settlements. 
75 There are already examples of statutes that provide incentives to private plain-
tiffs that correlate with the public interest, such as qui tam actions.  See, e.g., Federal 
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000) (allowing private individuals to enforce gov-
ernment fraud claims by filing the suit themselves and sharing in the recovery with the 
government).  For a discussion of qui tam actions and litigation incentives, see gener-
ally Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &  
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1997). 
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A.  Framework 1  
Openness as Efficient:  Increasing the Number of Viable Suits,  
Thereby Increasing Compensation and Deterrence 
“Framework 1” is based on two papers by economists Andrew F. 
Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum.76  In their paper entitled Hush 
Money, Daughety and Reinganum create an incomplete information 
model in which a plaintiff offers several settlement demands, one of 
which involves secrecy, to the defendant who must then decide 
whether and how to settle.77  In their model, the plaintiff, P1, will al-
ways go to trial when her expected damages exceed her litigation 
costs.78  A future plaintiff, P2, can only learn of the complicity of the 
defendant, D, in P1’s injury through publicity created by the outcome 
of P1’s lawsuit.79  In addition, the model assumes a “weak” correlation 
between D’s culpability for P1’s injury and her culpability for P2’s in-
jury.80  Daughety and Reinganum construct a reasonable publicity 
range in which, at one end, P2 learns of D’s culpability through a 
completed trial; without a trial, P2 has a smaller probability of learn-
ing of D’s culpability through open settlement, and a still smaller 
probability through confidential settlement.81  P2’s chance of learning 
of D’s culpability is greater than zero for all of these options; that is, 
even a confidential settlement has some probability of alerting future 
plaintiffs.82
Addressing the other end of the negotiating table, Daughety and 
Reinganum describe D as being in one of four types of scenarios.  
These scenarios are created by combining high or low culpability with 
the existence or lack of a future plaintiff, P2.  Each scenario is signi-
fied by a “type pair” as H1, H0, L1, or L0, where H=high culpability, 
L=low culpability, 1=potential P2, and 0=no potential P2.83  Daughety 
and Reinganum assess whether the parties will prefer unrestricted bar-
76 While not intending to delve into the detailed technical aspects of the papers, I 
will lay out the foundations and conclusions of the two models. 
77 Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Hush Money, 30 RAND J. ECON. 
661 (1999). 
78 See id. at 665 (stating that a plaintiff will pursue a case if the expected net return 
is positive). 
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 666 (explaining that this particular model addresses a situation in 
which D may, though not necessarily, be the source of P2’s injuries). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 666-67. 
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gaining (allowing secrecy) or restricted bargaining (prohibiting se-
crecy). 
Regarding the plaintiffs, Daughety and Reinganum conclude that 
P1 will always prefer unrestricted bargaining because she can extract a 
larger offer from H1 or L1 defendants, who fear potential P2s.84  They 
also conclude that P2 will always prefer restricted bargaining, because 
this will enable her to obtain enough information to be compensated 
herself.85  Regarding the defendants, Daughety and Reinganum ex-
plain that D will vary in their preferences in the four types of scenar-
ios.86  Even so, a general point emerges from the model:  secret set-
tlements allow P1 to extract hush money at the expense of P2.87  Thus, 
the authors conclude: 
[W]hen one party wants to limit the diffusion of information to parties 
outside of the current negotiation, this provides bargaining power to the 
other party involved in the current negotiation.  This effect is capitalized 
in a higher payment by the first party to the second, a payment that is fre-
quently financed (implicitly) by the unsuspecting third party.
88
If one imagines that the public has a general interest in compen-
sating potential future injured plaintiffs, secrecy hurts the public by 
allowing P1 to benefit from a defendant’s fear of future lawsuits.  In 
this situation, D and P1 are generally in favor of secrecy, while the 
public and P2 are generally not in favor of secrecy. 
A second article by Daughety and Reinganum provides a comple-
mentary model with similar conclusions:  a two-period model, in 
which the defendant has the opportunity to choose either a confiden-
tial regime or an open regime.89  According to the model, before Pe-
riod 1, the defendant does not necessarily know her future liability.90  
By Period 2, D has learned, through litigation, of her liability.91  At this 
point, the consumer (P2 and the public) will most likely be at an “in-
formational disadvantage” if D chose a confidential regime.92  Other-
84 Id. at 672. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 672-73. 
87 Id. at 674. 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
89 Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety 3, 5 (revised 
September 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review). 
90 Id.  Daughety and Reinganum base their model on the paradigm of a product 
manufacturer whose product quality impacts future liability and sales. 
91 Id. at 8-9. 
92 Id. at 9. 
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wise, under an open regime, the consumer too would have learned 
about the defendant’s potential liability through litigation. 
The model sets up the predicted costs for defendants of both re-
gimes and payoffs for the general consumer (i.e., the public).93  
Daughety and Reinganum assume that the probability of a suit being 
viable—that a plaintiff will be able to provide sufficient evidence—is 
greater in open regimes than in confidential regimes.94  The model 
also assumes that plaintiffs with nonviable cases will not receive com-
pensation from a defendant.95  In sum, the model concludes that de-
fendants will prefer an open regime when the fraction of viable suits is 
not extremely high, because credible self-monitoring in an open re-
gime may cost the defendant less in the long run than repeated confi-
dential payments.96  Daughety and Reinganum explain, however, that 
when the fraction of viable suits becomes too high, the defendant will 
no longer prefer an open regime because the costs of litigation will 
have become prohibitive.97
In conclusion, Framework 1 views P1’s lawsuit as a source of valu-
able information for P2, increasing the number of viable legitimate 
suits and thus increasing compensation for victims.  Openness pre-
vents P1 from extracting extra payment from the defendant, which 
would have cost P2.  It compensates more individuals because more 
injured plaintiffs are able to gather information for their claim.  Even 
from D’s perspective, openness is financially advantageous.  Given that 
frivolous suits cannot succeed in this framework (a significant assump-
tion), D is not at the mercy of P1’s demands, allowing D to settle 
claims more cheaply.  Moreover, openness is in the public interest be-
cause it is most efficient.  Thus, in this framework, the public’s desire 
for compensation, deterrence, and cost-savings is fulfilled by increas-
ing openness. 
93 Openness costs include the company’s fixed costs of auditing while benefits in-
clude increased consumer confidence and purchasing.  Confidentiality may save on 
less potential litigation but will create costs through decreased potential sales and in-
creased price of settlement.  See id. at 9-10 (analyzing the model under the two re-
gimes). 
94 See id. at 7 (explaining how confidential settlements can prevent access to in-
formation that would increase the viability of future suits). 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 23-24 (determining that a firm would be willing to commit to openness 
when it does not increase the percentage of viable suits and when the actual cost of 
monitoring is less than the cost of settlements). 
97 See id. at 25. 
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B.  Framework 2   
Openness as Inefficient:  Increasing the Number of Nuisance Suits,  
Thereby Increasing Improper Payouts and Costs 
“Framework 2” is based primarily on Rosenberg and Shavell’s 
model, which establishes equilibrium strategies of the plaintiff and de-
fendant players based on their incentives.98  In their model, openness 
is costly because it encourages nuisance lawsuits.  The model deals ex-
clusively with nonviable nuisance suits—i.e., those without merit.  It 
uses variables to represent the plaintiff’s cost of filing a claim, the 
plaintiff’s settlement demand, the defendant’s cost of litigation, the 
plaintiff’s cost of litigation, the probability of the plaintiff’s success, 
and the amount of the plaintiff’s award by default or trial judgment.99  
Rosenberg and Shavell “assume that both parties know all these vari-
ables”;100 essentially, the model assumes completely informed parties. 
The model leads to several reasonable predictions.  If the plaintiff 
is unwilling to engage in litigation (if, for example, the cost of litigat-
ing is greater than the potential award) but still files a nonviable 
claim, she may be able to extract the defendant’s cost of an initial re-
sponse through settlement.101  I label this situation a “Category 1” suit.  
Assuming that the defendant’s initial response cost is less than the 
judge’s eventual award by default or trial, the defendant can agree to 
settle and pay any amount below the initial response cost.102  As long 
as the plaintiff’s cost of filing a claim is less than the defendant’s cost 
of initial response, the plaintiff has an incentive to file suit.103
On the other hand, if the plaintiff is willing to litigate (her cost of 
litigation is less than the potential award), she may extract an even 
greater amount from the defendant merely by filing her nonviable 
suit:  the cost of the defendant’s litigation plus the probability of suc-
cess multiplied by the potential award, capping out at just under the 
98 D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought For Their Nuisance 
Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 6 (1985) (describing each party’s choice to litigate or 
settle). 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  Costs and knowledge are critical aspects of settlement.  For an analysis of 
settlement incentives when there is asymmetric information and the possibility of fee-
shifting, see generally Eric Talley, Liability-Based Fee-Shifting Rules and Settlement Mecha-
nisms Under Incomplete Information, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461 (1995). 
101 Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 98, at 6-7. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 7-8 (detailing proofs regarding a plaintiff’s incentive to sue). 
  
2005] QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY 453 
 
total award.104  I label this a “Category 2” suit.  In either category, the 
defendant knows the plaintiff’s case is without merit, but settlement is 
the cheapest exit strategy. 
The authors conclude that (1) a plaintiff’s filing expense is usually 
minimal; (2) the courts are only able to weed out patently frivolous 
claims, thus not controlling the initial quality of claims; (3) a plaintiff 
may prevail without inquiry if unchallenged by the defendant; and (4) 
the defendant often has greater litigation costs in gathering evidence 
than the plaintiff has in filing a claim.105  This model, therefore, dem-
onstrates the prior work of Steven Shavell:106  it provides one instance 
in which the low private costs of initiating a suit are dangerously below 
that of the total cost to the public. 
Framework 2 predicts that plaintiffs without a viable case may still 
find it profitable to sue.107  However, it may be somewhat unrealistic to 
assume that the defendant’s initial response cost is necessarily high:  
filing a motion for summary judgment, for example, may actually be 
inexpensive.  A Category 1 suit may only result in a very small payout 
to the plaintiff.  In fact, critics have noted that Rosenberg and Shav-
ell’s model “can only explain nuisance suits that settle for very small 
amounts.”108  In addition, a Category 2 suit might not be feasible at all:  
how can a nonviable suit have a significant probability of a large 
award?  This possibility seems to rely primarily on the arbitrariness 
and “generosity” of juries. 
Lucian Bebchuk has helped explain these difficulties with 
Rosenberg and Shavell’s model.109  Bebchuk’s model focuses on nega-
tive-expected-value (NEV) suits in which the plaintiff’s expected litiga-
tion costs exceed the expected award.  In his model, these suits may or 
may not have merit—suits with small awards but a high probability of 
104 See id. at 7 (“[If] the plaintiff would be willing to engage in litigation, then he 
can obtain from the defendant not only his defense costs, . . . but also his expected 
loss.”). 
105 Id. at 9-10. 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43 (describing Shavell’s work). 
107 Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 98, at 9. 
108 Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation for Being a Nuisance:  Frivolous Law-
suits and Fee Shifting in a Repeated Play Game, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147, 148 (1998) 
(citing Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4 (1990)). 
109 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of 
Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). 
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winning could still be NEV suits.110  Bebchuk notes that Rosenberg 
and Shavell’s model is only applicable when the defendant incurs 
large up-front costs before the plaintiff incurs substantial costs.111  
Thus, if it is inexpensive to engage in pre-trial dismissal procedures, 
Rosenberg and Shavell’s model will not accurately predict the defen-
dant’s behavior—the defendant will litigate rather than settle, and the 
plaintiff cannot extract payment for filing.  Furthermore, Bebchuk 
predicts that the plaintiff’s extracted payment in an NEV suit will be 
just below the defendant’s cost of response, regardless of the expected 
judgment.112  This is similar to Rosenberg and Shavell’s prediction for 
a Category 1 suit.113
However, Bebchuk argues that even if the plaintiff cannot force 
the defendant to incur large up-front litigation costs, she might still 
create a credible threat to induce settlement.114  Bebchuk reconceptu-
alizes the litigation process such that litigation costs are spread out 
over time and bargaining takes place throughout the litigation proc-
ess.115  Bebchuk reasons that the plaintiff might have a more credible 
threat later in the process, when she only has a small fraction of her 
litigation costs remaining; the defendant and plaintiff are aware of 
this potential threat.116  Thus, this model predicts that the defendant 
might settle for an amount greater than her expected initial costs, by 
accounting for a potential settlement amount that a plaintiff might 
extract later in the process.117  This fear can make even a small-stakes 
nuisance suit potentially credible at the start.118
Turning back to Rosenberg and Shavell’s model, if a plaintiff is 
able to disregard her sunk costs later in the negotiation process, she 
will be slotted into Category 2 where the expected award exceeds the 
expected cost.  This bumps the defendant’s offered settlement 
110 See Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 108, at 148 (explaining that “Bebchuk is not 
considering nuisance suits per se”).  Thus, Category 1 lawsuits of Rosenberg and Shav-
ell’s model are both nuisance suits and NEV suits. 
111 Bebchuk, supra note 109, at 3. 
112 Id. at 17. 
113 See supra text accompanying note 101. 
114 See id. at 4 (maintaining that when negotiations reach the stage where only a 
small fraction of litigation costs remain, a plaintiff’s threat may seem more credible). 
115 See id. (focusing on the “divisibility” of litigation costs). 
116 Id. 
117 See id. at 7 (“The settlement amount agreed upon at the initial round will be 
shaped by the parties’ costs at the first stage and by the settlement amount that is ex-
pected to be agreed on if the parties were to reach the second bargaining round.”). 
118 See id. at 4, 6-9 (analyzing how the divisibility of litigation costs and continuous 
bargaining increases plaintiffs’ bargaining power and changes player strategies). 
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amount up to at least her expected costs plus the probable award.119  
Thus, even if the case starts as a Category 1 suit,120 if the plaintiff re-
evaluates her case and disregards her sunk costs, she might continue 
to pose a threat to the defendant.  As a result, the plaintiff could ex-
tract a higher settlement amount, somewhere between that predicted 
by Rosenberg and Shavell in Categories 1 and 2.  Bebchuk concludes 
that “plaintiffs have credible threats in a much wider set of cases—
including in numerous small-stakes cases—than has been suggested by 
prior economic analysis of the subject.”121
The defendant’s awareness of a possible second plaintiff will dra-
matically change her costs and benefits to settling.  Thus, in order to 
compare these nuisance suit models to the pro-openness models of 
Framework 1, we must incorporate the idea of a second plaintiff and a 
repeat defendant.122
Thomas Miceli predicts that a repeat defendant’s strategy will de-
pend on her perception of the fraction of viable suits.123  Miceli’s 
model is based on the assumption that all truly injured plaintiffs have 
positive-expected-value (PEV) suits while uninjured plaintiffs have 
only NEV suits.124  In his proof, he establishes that, if the fraction of 
truly injured plaintiffs is high, the defendant will prefer to settle all 
cases because settling is cheaper than pursuing litigation.125  But, 
across-the-board settlement creates a positive return for all plaintiffs 
119 Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 98, at 7. 
120 In a Category 1 suit, the defendant’s offered settlement would be just under 
her expected initial costs of response.  See supra text accompanying notes 101-03 (de-
scribing expected settlements in Category 1 suits). 
121 Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1.  Patricia Danzon, a noted scholar in medical mal-
practice, affirms this conclusion.  She states that “the plaintiff can increase the maxi-
mum a rational defendant would offer by increasing the latter’s expected costs, and 
conversely the defendant can decrease the minimum the plaintiff would settle for and 
increase the likelihood of his dropping the case by increasing his costs of proceeding.”  
DANZON, supra note 38, at 192. 
122 Note that both of these models exclude the problem of repeat play and the 
precedential effects of settling or litigating. 
123 See Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Deterrence of Nuisance Suits by Repeat Defendants, 13 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 135, 142 (1993) (explaining that the probability that a defen-
dant will litigate “decreases as the fraction of legitimate suits in the population in-
creases”). 
124 See id. at 136 (assuming that a truly injured plaintiff has a probability of winning 
greater than zero, while an uninjured plaintiff has a probability of winning of zero, 
though both have costs of filing and trial).  This contrasts with Rosenberg and Shavell’s 
description of a Category 2 suit, and also with Bebchuk’s theory.  See Rosenberg & 
Shavell, supra note 98, at 7-8; Bebchuk, supra note 109, at 4. 
125  Miceli, supra note 123, at 136. 
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who file suit, and thus both injured and uninjured plaintiffs will have 
incentive to file.126
This misplaced incentive leads to a defendant’s “equilibrium 
strategy”:  settling just frequently enough to save costs, but infre-
quently enough to make nuisance suits unprofitable.127  Equilibrium 
in the defendant’s strategy is achieved by balancing the “temptation” 
of immediate cost-savings through settlement with the necessary “en-
forcement” technique of occasionally litigating to prevent spawning 
nuisance lawsuits.128  As the fraction of legitimate suits increases, temp-
tation will begin to override enforcement tendencies.129  But if the de-
fendant establishes a reputation for settling, she may encourage rogue 
plaintiffs with meritless claims to attempt to extract settlement.  A sig-
nificant conclusion from Miceli’s model is, therefore, that the plain-
tiff’s behavior is conditional upon the defendant’s settlement history.  And, as 
a result, the defendant must tailor her strategy to accommodate the 
predicted reactions of potential plaintiffs.   
It is also interesting to note that some scholars have developed the 
concept of a repeat plaintiff.  As it is difficult to imagine a repeat 
plaintiff with consistent injuries, Farmer and Pecorino have developed 
a model where the repeat plaintiff’s lawyer may be able to establish a 
credible threat in a nuisance suit from the lawyer’s own reputation of 
refusing to settle.130  In addition, since the attorney is threatening to 
fully litigate to a verdict, the plaintiff can extract a settlement amount 
that approaches the defendant’s full costs of going to trial, a greater 
amount than initially predicted by Rosenberg and Shavell.131  Farmer 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 137.  According to some accounts, cigarette makers draw out litigation in 
order to absorb a plaintiff’s time and money and set a formidable precedent:  the to-
bacco industry has not paid any damages to private litigants in over forty-three years 
and 800 suits.  See, e.g., Garth Alexander, Up In Smoke, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 17, 
1996, Bus. Focus, at 3 (describing the tobacco industry’s forty-year united front against 
litigants); Mark Curriden, Tobacco Industry Lawsuit Becoming Endurance Test, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 1997, at 1A (asserting that the tobacco industry is expert at 
taking punches and using up the adversary’s money). 
128 Miceli, supra note 123, at 138-39. 
129 See id. at 140 (“A higher fraction of legitimate suits . . . both increases the de-
fendant’s temptation to deviate from his threat, since the savings from avoiding trial 
are larger, and reduces enforcement, since the number of deterrable suits is lower.”). 
130 See Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 108, at 150 (indicating that a defendant will 
consider opposing counsel’s reputation in deciding whether to settle). 
131 See id. at 151 (speculating that a defendant will be willing to accept any settle-
ment offer less than her likely cost of trial).  This would exceed Rosenberg and Shav-
ell’s prediction that a plaintiff could extract only the initial response costs.  Rosenberg 
and Shavell, supra note 98, at 6-7. 
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and Pecorino’s model further expands the number of credible nui-
sance suits and raises the settlement amount. 
In sum, Framework 2 is based on the work of Rosenberg and 
Shavell, who established the groundwork for explaining nuisance 
suits, and other scholars, who have built models expanding the ability 
of nuisance suits to extract settlement amounts larger than the defen-
dant’s initial response costs alone.  Framework 2 predicts that open-
ness provides fodder for nuisance suits, which impose costs on the de-
fendant and society without any benefit of deterrence or rightful 
compensation.  From this perspective, there is a costly divide between 
a plaintiff’s incentive to use the legal system and the benefits to the 
public from her choice to do so. 
C.  Reconciling the Opposing Frameworks 
In Framework 1, an open regime alerts future plaintiffs with 
credible cases, thus increasing the fraction of viable suits and promot-
ing the twin goals of tort law:  compensation and deterrence.  In 
Framework 2, an open regime alerts future plaintiffs with little likeli-
hood of success on the merits but who are able to benefit wrongfully 
from learning the defendant’s position.  Each framework presents one 
side of the equation and is incomplete without the other.  Comparing 
the assumptions and conclusions of Framework 1 and Framework 2 
should provide a more complete and holistic picture of the potential 
costs and benefits of confidentiality of settlements. 
The following table illustrates and summarizes the key premises 
and conclusions of the proponents of the two frameworks:132
132 These papers are, obviously, complex and involve many more assumptions and 
conclusions than those I have listed.  This table describes those relevant to the present 
analysis. 
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Framework 1:  Pro-Openness 
 






Future plaintiffs are 
initially ignorant; they 
rely on the disposi-
tion of P1’s case to 
inform them about 
the merits of their 
own cases. 
Open trial provides more 
publicity and information 
than an open settlement, 
which in turn provides 




Secrecy and Safety 
Plaintiffs cannot re-
cover in nonviable 
suits; they are able to 
recover only if the de-
fendant is culpable 
and caused their in-
jury. 
Greater publicity informs 
more injured plaintiffs, in-
creasing the fraction of vi-





Framework 2:  Pro-Confidentiality 
 






dants have mutual 
knowledge of parties’ 
costs and likelihood 
of success. 
Plaintiffs can recover on 
nonviable suits by extract-
ing the defendant’s initial 
costs of response. 
Bebchuk; 
Farmer and  
Pecorino 
Plaintiff is able to es-
tablish a credible 
threat later in the 
litigation process, 
even if not initially; or 




Plaintiffs can recover on 
nonviable suits for 
amounts greater than the 
defendants’ initial costs of 
response. 
Miceli Repeat defendants 
have an optimal strat-
egy of response in 
order to reduce pre-
sent costs and deter 
future suits. 
Settlement is optimal if 
there is a high fraction of 
viable suits; however, a 
reputation for settlement 
may encourage frivolous 
suits. 
  
2005] QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY 459 
 
 
The pro-confidentiality and pro-openness frameworks share some 
of the same assumptions.  In the pro-openness framework, plaintiffs 
are at least partially dependent on signals and information from prior 
cases against the defendant.133  In the pro-confidentiality framework, 
plaintiffs are knowledgeable about the merits and costs of their own 
case but use signals from prior lawsuits to evaluate defendant’s strat-
egy and ultimately decide whether to sue.134  Thus, the behavior of fu-
ture plaintiffs is conditional upon a defendant’s decision to litigate or 
settle.  The difference in the frameworks is fundamentally based upon 
which plaintiffs are able to prevail after reading the signals:  Daughety 
and Reinganum assume that only truly injured plaintiffs will succeed, 
while Rosenberg and Shavell’s models demonstrate the possible suc-
cess of nonviable suits. 
Assuming that nonviable suits can indeed succeed, our goal 
should be to provide incentives that will reduce the number of frivo-
lous plaintiffs while facilitating the claims of truly injured plaintiffs.  In 
other words, we want to create incentives that align as closely as possi-
ble to the social costs and benefits of each suit.135
From the above table, I have derived several Rules: 
Rule 1:  Future Plaintiffs’ Decisions to Sue Are Partially Conditional 
Upon a Defendant’s Past Decisions to Litigate, Settle Openly,  
or Settle Confidentially 
Rule 1 is derived from a combination of Daughety and Rein-
ganum’s work with Miceli’s.  Daughety and Reinganum conclude that 
the information provided by litigation or an open settlement helps fu-
ture plaintiffs form their cases; Miceli concludes that a defendant’s 
litigation strategy may affect future litigants’ decisions to file a claim 
initially and whether to settle or litigate once the claim is filed. 
133 See Daughety & Reinganum, Hush Money, supra note 77, at 663 (“[A]ssuming 
that some potential plaintiffs do not know they have a case, and that the disposition of 
a previous case can affect whether or not later plaintiffs file suit.”). 
 134 See Miceli, supra note 123, at 137 (assuming that plaintiffs will adopt a strategy 
dependent on the defendant’s settlement strategy).   
135 See supra text accompanying notes 35-41 (discussing the myriad costs, benefits, 
and incentives that may factor into a plaintiff’s decision to litigate, which often diverge 
from society’s interests). 
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Rule 2:  Future Plaintiffs Receive One or More Types of Information 
from a Defendant’s Action:  A Strategy Signal and/or  
Information Relevant to Culpability 
Rule 2 is derived from combining the pro-openness framework 
with the pro-confidentiality framework.  The pro-openness framework 
concludes that the information provided by settlements to future 
plaintiffs increases just compensation.  This is because future plaintiffs 
learn evidentiary information about their case.  However, the pro-
confidentiality framework establishes that nuisance suits can succeed, 
and that a defendant’s decision to settle or litigate may affect other 
plaintiffs’ decisions to litigate.  These frameworks indicate, therefore, 
that there are actually two types of information at issue:  information 
about culpability and information about the defendant’s litigation 
strategy. 
Rule 3:  In Settlements, Strategy Signals Are Likely to Encourage 
Frivolous Lawsuits; Information Relevant to Culpability  
Is Likely to Increase Meritorious Suits 
Rule 3 simply sorts the effects of the two types of information in 
Rule 2.  Rule 3 will effectively inform plaintiffs about how to proceed 
with their own litigation.  Strategy signals are at least somewhat useful 
to all plaintiffs, whether their claims are meritorious or not.  However, 
a mere strategy signal will not provide actual facts or case-specific in-
formation that would allow a future plaintiff to formulate a claim or 
gather evidence.  Culpability information is far more useful to a meri-
torious plaintiff because it has evidentiary value in proving her case.  
On the other hand, culpability information is considerably less useful 
to plaintiffs with frivolous claims, since they are more likely to try to 
extract a quick initial settlement (as opposed to proceeding with liti-
gation).  Even if the culpability information might help the frivolous 
plaintiff establish a more credible threat, the strategy signal would be 
far more useful because it would indicate how the defendant could be 
expected to act in settlement negotiations. 
 
The Rules point to the crux of the problem:  all signals are not 
created equal.  The type of information provided by the signal creates 
different incentives for different plaintiffs.  Daughety and Reinganum 
implicitly acknowledge the variation in signal types by their range of 
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publicity quantity.136  I believe there is an additional level of variation:  
the open settlement itself may have a range of different information 
types.  An open settlement may provide useful facts about the inci-
dent, or it may indicate only that the defendant is willing to settle for a 
certain amount.  The first may encourage injured plaintiffs to obtain 
rightful compensation, while the second might incentivize frivolous 
suits. 
Rule 3 sorts signals into two categories.  “Quantitative” signals are 
those that indicate facts about whether and how the defendant settled.  
“Qualitative” signals are those that provide information about the al-
legations, circumstances, and culpability of the defendant.  For exam-
ple, assume a defendant settled with a plaintiff, P1, who alleged that 
the defendant’s dumping of toxic chemicals into a lake caused her 
daughter’s rare form of cancer.  The settlement agreement will con-
tain factual allegations as well as a settlement amount.  Specific infor-
mation about the allegations (e.g., the timing of dumping, the type of 
disease contracted, the method of contraction, the chemical dumped) 
will help others in assessing whether the defendant’s actions injured 
them as well.  Such information would help those potential future 
plaintiffs to establish whether the defendant’s culpability for P1’s in-
jury correlates with their own cases.  This information is a qualitative 
signal.  Information about the actual settlement amount (e.g., defen-
dant paid P1 $1 million) only informs the public about the defen-
dant’s strategy; it may convey some information about the defendant’s 
culpability in that case, but it primarily encourages future plaintiffs to 
formulate demands that they may not otherwise have formulated.  
This information is a quantitative signal. 
A fully confidential settlement provides essentially no signal.  An 
open settlement, however, may contain quantitative signals, qualitative 
signals, or both.  It follows that all open settlements are not equal in 
terms of costs or benefits.  I predict that open settlements’ societal 
costs and benefits depend on the extent to which the signals con-
tained in those settlements are qualitative or quantitative.  Lawmakers 
can sort meritorious suits from nonviable suits by carefully crafting 
laws that are sensitive to the particular incentives provided by a set-
tlement’s type of openness. 
For example, if our goal is to maximize legitimate compensation 
while deterring frivolous suits, we can predict which types of “sun-
136 See supra text accompanying notes 79-82 (describing how litigation and open 
settlements provide more information than closed settlements). 
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shine” reforms will be most effective in meeting these joint goals.  
Across-the-board sunshine regimes will provide uniform openness, at 
the cost of encouraging frivolous lawsuits; blanket confidentiality will 
prevent just compensation.  Alternatively, sunshine regimes tailored to 
specific areas where the public interest is especially great will likely be 
the most efficient.  Even then, the type of “sunshine” is still critical.  In 
order to inform an injured P2 about a defendant’s culpability, we 
should ensure that the signal given is as qualitative as possible. 
There is obviously no clear line dividing the effects of a qualitative 
signal from those of a quantitative signal.  A truly injured plaintiff who 
receives only quantitative signals might still be encouraged to sue, 
while a frivolous plaintiff might initiate a nuisance suit based solely on 
qualitative signals.137  However, a quantitative signal about the amount 
of settlement is generally less useful to a meritorious plaintiff, while a 
frivolous plaintiff could find the amount of a past settlement very im-
portant in formulating her future demands.138
Very large settlements could be one exception to this generaliza-
tion.  Learning that the defendant recently made a massive settlement 
or payment to a previous plaintiff might suggest that the defendant 
was guilty of what the prior plaintiff alleged; of course, it may not nec-
essarily indicate that the defendant is responsible for the potential 
plaintiff’s injury.  Furthermore, certain defendants may value settle-
ment very highly and pay out large sums to avoid steep litigation costs.  
Regardless, unusual settlement amounts may indicate more than just 
strategy on the defendant’s part. 
Generally, sunshine regimes that publish only the quantitative as-
pects of a settlement will be especially prone to encouraging frivolous 
lawsuits and, compared to regimes that publish qualitative signals, will 
not provide society with as much information useful in preventing po-
tential danger.  In short, quantitative signals are more likely to pro-
duce public costs without increasing public benefit.  Furthermore, re-
gimes that publish the amount of settlement seem doubly dubious:  if 
the plaintiff knows how much the defendant is “good for,” she has 
greater insight into the defendant’s strategy.  Conversely, although 
137 See DANZON, supra note 38, at 192 (“In practice there is no clear distinction be-
tween legal actions that generate information and promote more accurate deterrence, 
and those that serve purely strategic purposes.”). 
138 Rosenberg and Shavell assume that a plaintiff and defendant jointly know the 
costs of litigation.  Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 98, at 6.  If the plaintiff did not 
know this information, however, learning the amount of a prior settlement would be a 
powerful indicator of the defendant’s costs of litigation and future settlement amount. 
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qualitative signals might encourage some costs, they are far more 
likely to encourage the public benefits of deterrence and just com-
pensation.  As a result, we can hope to maximize public benefits and 
minimize overall costs by tailoring the sunshine laws to provide quali-
tative signals in the fields and industries where the public has the 
greatest interest due to health, safety, and welfare concerns. 
IV.  A PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATION:   
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SETTLEMENTS 
As sunshine regimes become more prevalent across the country, 
predictions about the costs and benefits of confidential settlements 
become more relevant and pressing.  As noted in Part II.C, a statutory 
solution is likely the best approach to restrict confidential settlements 
because it would not be as prone to uneven judicial application as a 
procedural rule permitting case-by-case judicial discretion.  In addi-
tion, a statutory solution can be more precise:  it can target those in-
dustries in which the public has the greatest interest in requiring 
openness. 
This Comment calls for tailoring the openness movement in two 
ways.  First, the legislature should target a program of mandatory 
openness by field or industry.  Certain industries, such as pharmaceu-
tical producers, automotive makers, and healthcare providers require 
greater state or federal legislative restrictions on confidential settle-
ments due to the potential for public hazard.  On the other hand, pri-
vate contractual disputes that do not directly implicate public health 
or safety concerns should be free to settle confidentially.  In other 
words, parties deserve contractual autonomy unless the public or legis-
latures conclude that openness is required in a particular realm in or-
der to further public safety.  Second, the legislature should craft sun-
shine laws to promote qualitative signals about the defendant’s 
culpability in order to increase the societal benefit.  Meanwhile, legis-
lators should be wary of promoting quantitative signals and should be 
cognizant of the risk of increasing frivolous lawsuits. 
In the absence of legislative solutions, some courts have taken dra-
matic steps.  For example, the District of South Carolina recently en-
acted a local rule strictly prohibiting a judge from placing a settlement 
agreement under seal.139  This approach is a blunt, across-the-board 
139 DIST. S.C. CIV. R. 5.03(E) (“No settlement agreement filed with the Court shall 
be sealed . . . .”).  Rule 5.03 is significantly harsher than most other district court local 
rules, which bar secret settlements only where the public interest or safety is at issue.  
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sunshine rule.  The District of South Carolina is justifiably frustrated 
by judges who seem unable to effectively restrict confidential settle-
ments between parties.  However, a complete prohibition of confiden-
tial settlements is not the right approach, nor is it appropriate for the 
judiciary to make such a decision.  According to the above discussion, 
this policy will not be efficient because it fails on both fronts:  first, it 
applies indiscriminately to any settlement, regardless of the type of 
lawsuit; and second, it treats all types of information the same.  As a 
result, it will facilitate compensation but simultaneously encourage 
frivolous lawsuits. 
Other states, however, have adopted a more tailored approach 
through legislative regulation of targeted industries.  For example, 
some states restrict the confidentiality of medical malpractice settle-
ments without outlawing secret settlements altogether.  These states 
have created a disclosure system which publishes medical malpractice 
histories of physicians, attempting to provide information to health-
care consumers.  This approach, aside from being much more tar-
geted, is different from the District of South Carolina’s approach in 
that it does not prohibit secrecy but actually mandates open publica-
tion.  These states have already tailored their legislation by industry, 
and therefore are heading in the right direction.  However, the man-
ner and method of publication (i.e., what information is actually pub-
lished) will determine what sort of signals these laws will provide to fu-
ture litigants. 
In order to facilitate the practical application of the Rules that I 
have described above, I will outline sunshine laws in the medical mal-
practice area and proceed to analyze the signals created by these laws.  
In doing so, I hope to illuminate the manner in which my proposed 
Rules can help direct legislatures to the appropriate statutory action. 
A.  Background and the Federal Requirements 
Congress passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986 (HCQIA) in order to create a federal data bank of medical mal-
See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.  Chief Judge Joseph Anderson, Jr., of the Dis-
trict of South Carolina, supports Rule 5.03’s restriction on secret settlements, in par-
ticular because it prevents judges from balancing docket pressures against the public’s 
need for information.  See Anderson, supra note 48, at 729 (“[J]udges face incredible 
pressure to go along with court-ordered secrecy in the heat of battle.”); cf. Toal & Ri-
ley, supra note 17, at 768-70 (describing and defending South Carolina’s civil proce-
dure rule, S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1, which generally favors sunshine and openness). 
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practice settlements.140  The resulting data bank, which hospitals are 
required to access before hiring any prospective doctor, provides in-
formation on each physician.141  The data bank’s information is avail-
able to state licensing boards as well.142  Information collected 
through the HCQIA is confidential; unless otherwise provided by state 
law, it may only be disclosed to the physician or practitioner involved 
or for “professional review activity.” 143
This exact provision became the central issue last June in Medical 
Society of New Jersey v. Mottola, in the U.S. District Court in New Jer-
sey.144  In Mottola, the plaintiffs contested a New Jersey statute that al-
lowed disclosure of all medical malpractice judgments and settle-
ments.145  The New Jersey Health Care Consumer Information Act 
(NJHCCIA) required medical malpractice settlements to be pub-
lished.146  Under the NJHCCIA, “[a]ll medical malpractice court 
judgments and all medical malpractice arbitration awards reported to 
the applicable board, in which a payment has been awarded to the 
complaining party during the most recent five years, and all settle-
ments of medical malpractice claims reported to the board” should be 
published, including settlements reached prior to the law’s enact-
140 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2000).  According to the HCQIA, any insurance en-
tity which makes a payment in settlement or in order to satisfy a judgment is subject to 
its reporting requirements.  Id. § 11131(a).  The insurance agency must provide the 
name of the physician or health care practitioner, the amount of payment, the name 
of the hospital affiliated with the physician or health care provider, a description of the 
actions upon which the claim was based, and any other information necessary for ap-
propriate interpretation.  Id. § 11131(b). 
141 Id. § 11135. 
142 Id. § 11137(a). 
143 Id. § 11137(b)(1).  Although confidentiality is presumed, the HCQIA leaves 
open a potential avenue of publicity:  “Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the dis-
closure of such information by a party which is otherwise authorized, under applicable 
State law, to make such disclosure.”  Id. 
144 320 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D.N.J. 2004). 
145 Id. at 261.  The plaintiffs in Mottola claimed, inter alia, that their “right to pri-
vacy, secured to them under federal law, namely the HCQIA, would be deprived under 
color of state law” if such information were published.  Id. at 264.  The plaintiffs also 
made various claims alleging that the law violated their constitutional rights.  Id. at 271-
73. 
146 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.22 (West 2004).  New Jersey has had reporting re-
quirements similar to the HCQIA in place since 1983, although the content of the re-
porting under such laws has been confidential.  See Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 259-60 
(acknowledging that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30D-17 (West 1994), passed in 1983, requires 
a Medical Practitioner Review Panel to maintain malpractice settlement records that 
are protected by the confidentiality provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-19.3 and 45:9-
19.10(c) (West 2004)). 
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ment.147  The court upheld the statute, concluding that “[t]here is no 
provision in the HCQIA that makes information independently col-
lected by a state agency confidential.”148  Furthermore, the HCQIA 
condones New Jersey’s law by allowing for state disclosure.149
B.  The Complexity of Medical Malpractice Settlements:   
Does a Settlement Amount Convey Culpability? 
The Mottola court assumed that the NJHCCIA was in the public in-
terest because “providing consumers with relevant information about 
physicians’ backgrounds helps consumers to make informed choices 
with regard to medical services.”150  In addition, malpractice litigation 
serves an important function in compensating victims of poor care, 
disciplining negligent doctors, and placing the cost of injury on insur-
ers who pool risk and are most capable of payment.  This rationale, 
however, is diminished by the mandatory disclaimer published along 
with each profile in New Jersey: 
Settlement of a claim and, in particular, the dollar amount of the settle-
ment may occur for a variety of reasons, which do not necessarily reflect 
negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the physi-
cian . . . . A payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or 
claim should not be construed as creating a presumption that medical 
malpractice has occurred.
151
147 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.23(a)(10) (West 2004).  NJHCCIA and HCQIA gen-
erally require the same reporting requirements:  the Mottola court acknowledged that 
“insurance companies routinely comply with their State law reporting obligation by 
providing the [Medical Practitioner Review] Panel with a paper copy of the report that 
the insurance carrier submits to the Data Bank, pursuant to the HCQIA.”  Mottola, 320 
F. Supp. 2d at 260 (citation omitted).  The very same information, however, is not con-
fidential once submitted under the NJHCCIA. 
148 Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 270.  Thus, even if the information submitted is ex-
actly the same, as long as the insurers submit the information separately to the New 
Jersey Medical Practitioner Review Panel (not through the federal Data Bank), the 
HCQIA’s confidentiality provisions do not apply.  Id.  The court declined to address 
whether the retroactivity of the NJHCCIA violated the physicians’ expectation of pri-
vacy.  Id. at 270-71. 
149 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (2000). 
150 Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 272. 
151 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.23(a)(10)(d) (West 2004).  Other states that publish 
physician profiles have similar disclaimers.  See, e.g.,; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-
4603(1)(o)(iii) (2003) (adding a comparable disclaimer to the state’s malpractice re-
porting requirements); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (LexisNexis 2004) (mandating 
reporting of all malpractice settlements to a review board accompanied by a similar 
disclaimer). 
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If a settlement amount does not “necessarily reflect negatively on 
the professional competence or conduct of the physician,” how does it 
provide the public “relevant” information?  The central question, 
therefore, is whether settlement information conveys useful informa-
tion to the public:  does a settlement indicate that the doctor who set-
tled was negligent or incompetent? 
From the outset, publishing the amount of a settlement appears to 
be a quantitative signal.  Of course, there may be some way that it still 
conveys important qualitative information about the doctor’s compe-
tence.  First, if settlements indicate incompetence, one would assume 
that medical malpractice insurers would increase premiums for doc-
tors who have settled prior claims.  This does indeed occur, but to a 
much smaller degree than one would expect.  In general, doctors’ 
medical malpractice rates are far more dependent upon their spe-
cialty than their personal history:  riskier specialties are prone to more 
lawsuits and thus carry higher premiums.152  In addition, one would 
expect a doctor with a poor record to be paying much higher rates 
than one without any claims against her.  Though recent crises in the 
malpractice industry have made insurers much more sensitive to a 
doctor’s claim history, this has not always been the case.153  Insurers 
152 Specialty makes a far greater impact on premium rates than the type of prac-
tice, age of physician, or location of practice.  Data from the American Medical Asso-
ciation show that self-employed physicians who specialize in obstetrics and gynecology 
or surgery have premiums between three and four times greater than that of a general 
family practitioner.  AM. MED. ASS’N, THE GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE 127 (1991); see also DANZON, supra note 38, at 95 (concluding that rating 
structures have changed to include “more variation in specialty differentials among 
states”); Richard Zeckhauser & Albert L. Nichols, Lessons from the Economics of Safety, in 
ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 19, 23 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978) (noting 
that most malpractice insurance policies “base the premium solely on the physician’s 
specialty, and not on his past record of malpractices suits”).  Settlements may not even 
be reflective of the doctor’s personal performance, but instead reflective of an entire 
department or hospital.  See Mary Jo Layton et al., Doctors’ Insurers Paid $1B in 5 Years:  
Judge Orders Release of Malpractice Data, RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), June 9, 2004, at A1 
(relating a department chair’s fear that his position makes him appear responsible for 
lawsuits in his department in which he played no direct role); Jennifer Silverman, Con-
fidential Settlements:  New Jersey To Open Physician Malpractice Records, OB/GYN NEWS, 
Mar. 14, 2004, at 30 (discussing the factors involved in the insurer’s decision to settle, 
and concluding that the decision to settle does not necessarily reflect poor care on the 
part of the doctor).  
153 See DANZON, supra note 38, at 94-95 (finding that there has been “very little rat-
ing on the basis of individual exposure or experience” since 1975, so that “individual 
surcharges are applied to no more than [one] to [two] percent of physicians”).  But see 
Michelle M. Mello, The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2281, 2282 
(2003) (stating that some insurers will no longer provide insurance to doctors with any 
sort of claims record); Berkeley Rice, We Settled, I Lost, MED. ECON., Oct. 8, 2004, at 49, 
  
468 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 433 
 
have not always viewed medical malpractice suits as accurate indica-
tors of incompetence; in fact, certain studies have shown that jury ver-
dicts in malpractice cases reflect the victim’s injury more than the 
doctor’s culpability.154  Other studies have shown that while negligent 
injuries might exceed claims, the two categories do not overlap sub-
stantially:  most victims of negligent care do not bring suit, and only a 
very small percentage of malpractice suits involve negligent care.155  
Lastly, it may take a medical malpractice claim a long time to wind 
through the system; therefore, a recent payment might only reflect 
the doctor’s actions many years ago. 
Furthermore, medical malpractice insurers often settle with plain-
tiffs, and may do so over the doctor’s objections.156  The insurance 
company may not consider lawsuits to be representative of doctors’ 
competence, partially because the companies do not allow the doctor 
to defend herself.157  Moreover, a doctor might settle cases that reflect 
the care provided in the hospital or the department, rather than the 
care provided by the doctor in her individual capacity.158  Insurers 
might settle because it is the cheaper option, not because the doctor is 
actually guilty of negligence.  Studies have shown that medical mal-
practice litigation is more costly than settlement;159 thus, insurers 
50, available at http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=127166 
(describing a situation where an insurer cancelled a doctor’s policy due to “claim and 
suit frequency and severity”).  See generally David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 
350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 283 (2004) (describing the national “crisis” of malpractice 
litigation). 
154 See, e.g., Studdert, supra note 153, at 285 (detailing the “disconnections ob-
served between injury and litigation”). 
155 Id. 
156 Different insurers treat medical malpractice claims differently.  See, e.g., AM. 
MED. ASS’N, supra note 152, at 113 (noting that some insurers may not settle without 
the physician’s consent but that others retain total control over the decision to settle); 
see also Rice, supra note 153, at 49 (describing the negative outcomes emanating from a 
forced settlement by a doctor who did not want to settle due to the stigma of settle-
ment as an admission of guilt). 
157 Settlement decisions are obviously complex.  The AMA notes that some con-
siderations to be weighed are “whether liability is obvious, whether the plaintiff is a 
very sympathetic character, and whether one or more of the physician defendant(s) is 
likely to be a poor witness.”  AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 152, at 107. 
158 See Layton, supra note 152, at A1 (discussing an obstetrician’s settlement of 
three claims as a director of the hospital perinatal high-risk unit). 
159 Ninety percent of all medical malpractice cases are settled out of court.  DAN-
ZON, supra note 38, at 31.  Previous studies have found that a plaintiff is twice as likely 
to receive payment through settlement than through litigation.  See id. (finding that 
plaintiffs win one in four medical malpractice cases litigated, but half of all plaintiffs 
who settle out of court receive some payment).  This statistic appears to vindicate 
Rosenberg, Shavell, and Bebchuk’s predictions that a plaintiff who would not succeed 
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might be settling cases for financial reasons, regardless of culpability, 
further bolstering the claim that settlement amounts do not reflect 
care quality.  However, this strategy could be costly:  according to Mi-
celi, the insurers’ strategy of repeat settlement will be efficient only if 
the number of suits does not rise beyond a critical point.160
Supporters of mandatory publication of settlement agreements 
might argue that even if settlements do not reflect physician compe-
tence (and are not useful tools for the consumer), they effectively de-
ter physician misconduct through the mere publication of data.  Phy-
sician licensing boards have been notoriously ineffectual in 
disciplining incompetent physicians.161  Thus, it is possible that the 
mandatory publication of all settlement amounts provides much-
needed deterrence.162  Since doctors’ premiums may not rise with ad-
ditional lawsuits, insurers are effectively insulating doctors from some 
of the financial cost of negligence; accordingly, an additional method 
of deterrence is necessary.163  Nevertheless, it does not seem likely that 
at trial may still extract payment.  See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 98, at 3; 
Bebchuk, supra note 109, at 4.  It should be noted that post-verdict awards are gener-
ally much higher than out-of-court settlements.  DANZON, supra note 38, at 31. 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 123-29 (discussing Miceli’s model of party 
behavior). 
161 See, e.g., Arthur Kane & Allison Sherry, Buried Mistakes, DENVER POST, Mar. 7, 
2004, at 1A (revealing the Colorado Board of Medical Examiner’s inability to hold 
physicians accountable for negligence); Tony Leys, Mercy Ordered to Pay $3 Million in 
Lawsuit, DES MOINES REG., July 16, 2004, at 1A (describing a situation where a hospital 
allowed a negligent doctor to continue practicing even though the Iowa Board of 
Medical Examiners had ordered him to quit); Opinion, Right To Know:  Patients Deserve 
to Know Doctors’ Histories, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 10, 2004, at L6 (citing an 
investigation that found that the few doctors in New Jersey with multiple malpractice 
claims and settlements had never been punished by the Board of Medical Examiners); 
Walsh & Weiser, Secret Filing, Settlement Hide Surgeon’s Record, supra note 1 (revealing the 
ineffectiveness of hospitals’ physician-review systems).  Of course, licensing boards may 
view the settlements as poor indicators of care quality, just as insurers do. 
162 See Steven Shavell, Theoretical Issues in Medical Malpractice, in ECONOMICS OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 152, at 35, 44 (noting that society has to resort to 
nonmarket institutions to guarantee physician care quality when patients are unable to 
adequately judge medical service quality). 
163 See id. at 40-43 (discussing the moral hazard problem where insurance reduces 
the physicians’ incentives to avoid loss); Zeckhauser & Nichols, supra note 152, at 30 
(finding that premiums must reflect the claims record of individual providers in order 
to create meaningful financial incentives for physicians).  Some scholars believe that 
each plaintiff’s compensation should derive from her own estimate of risk (through 
insurance), rather than the doctor’s negligence, suggesting that court awards are not 
the most efficient method of compensation.  See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-
BP-H-119, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 47 (1993) (de-
scribing “contracting for liability” as a potential reform where patients become con-
sumers who “structure malpractice liability to suit their own needs, balancing price and 
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mere publication of settlement information will effectively deter phy-
sicians who are insured against such lawsuits.  The time, energy, and 
frustration of litigation and settlement are probably far more valuable 
deterrents than publishing a physician’s name in a database. 
As I have argued in this Part, publication of a medical malpractice 
settlement amount might be only a quantitative signal that does not 
necessarily reflect a defendant’s negligence or culpability.  Thus, such 
publication provides more of a strategy signal to future plaintiffs, in-
creasing nuisance suits and imposing extra costs on society.  In con-
trast, qualitative signals provide useful information to the general pub-
lic.  Although qualitative signals are optimal, Mottola indicates that 
state courts may uphold sunshine laws that publish information con-
taining quantitative signals to future litigants.  Therefore, state legisla-
tures need to carefully craft sunshine laws to provide qualitative in-
formation to healthcare consumers rather than mere strategy signals.  
If they succeed, state sunshine laws can be both just and efficient.  
C.  Converting Signals from Quantitative to Qualitative  
Under Different State Approaches 
New Jersey is not alone in its effort to inform healthcare consum-
ers:  the Mottola court took comfort in the fact that Massachusetts had 
already broken ground by being the first state to publish physician 
malpractice histories, and several others have done so since.164  Al-
though these states all publish some sort of physician profile, the type 
of information about medical malpractice settlements provided varies 
from state to state.  These different types of information create differ-
ent signals for future plaintiffs, both quantitative and qualitative.  Un-
der Rule 3 of my analysis in Part III.C, a legislative requirement to 
quality”); Shavell, supra note 162, at 55 (arguing that compensation should depend on 
the plaintiff’s assessment of risk and injury because court awards are often inappropri-
ately calculated and costly). 
164 See Med. Soc’y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254, 262 n.4 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(noting a “growing multi-state trend to provide citizens with better information about 
their physicians’ backgrounds”); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 § 5(f) (LexisNexis  
2004) (setting forth profile requirements); Mark J. Greenwood, The Physician Profile 
Database:  Publishing Malpractice Information on the Internet, 21 J. LEG. MED. 477, 492-503 
(2000) (discussing the significance of Massachusetts’ physician profile database, which 
provides an “unprecedented amount of information” to consumers).  See generally CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 803.1 (2003) (setting forth profile content requirements); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 456.041 (LexisNexis 2001) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-4603(o)(i) 
(2003) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-9.2(a)(2)(vii) (2004); New Jersey Health Care 
Profile, http://www.njdoctorlist.com (follow “About the Health Care Profile” link) 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005) (explaining the contents of the health care profile). 
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publish settlement amounts should be tailored to provide the most 
qualitative information while preventing an excess of quantitative in-
formation that might induce frivolous lawsuits.  An analysis of differ-
ent state approaches reveals that certain approaches may be more ef-
ficient in encouraging meritorious suits and deterring frivolous suits. 
As mentioned, under the NJHCCIA, the New Jersey State Board of 
Medical Examiners publishes the exact amount of physicians’ medical 
malpractice awards, settlements, and judgments for five years.165  New 
Jersey also provides information on how many doctors in a field or 
practice area made medical malpractice settlements in the previous 
five years, to provide some context for the physician’s claim history.166
Massachusetts’ legislation also requires that the Medical Board of 
Registration create a data repository of physician profiles and make 
the profiles available to the public.  The profile must include all 
medical malpractice court settlements, arbitration awards, and settle-
ments that occurred in the previous ten years.167  Yet, instead of re-
porting the exact amount of settlement, it reports a doctor’s settle-
ment history as being below average, average, or above average.168  
Massachusetts also lists judgment and settlement statistics for the doc-
tor’s specialty, putting a particular doctor’s history into context.169  
Rhode Island has recently enacted its own physician profile statute, 
modeled after Massachusetts and with the same requirements.170
Other states only publish information if the doctor has paid set-
tlements exceeding a threshold level of frequency or amount.  Flor-
ida’s physician profile law requires that settlement payments made in 
165 New Jersey Health Care Consumer Information Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-
22.23 (West 2004); see New Jersey Health Care Profile, supra note 164. 
166 See New Jersey Health Care Profile, supra note 164 (providing physician pro-
files, which include information about doctors’ malpractice payments, and cautioning 
users that malpractice information should be viewed in reference to risks associated 
with particular fields and practice groups). 
167 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 § 5(f) (LexisNexis  2004) (setting forth disclosure 
requirements). 
168 See Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine:  On-Line Physician Profile 
Site, http://profiles.massmedboard.org/Profiles/MA-Physician-Profile-Find-Doctor.asp 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2005) (allowing consumers to learn about physicians’ malpractice 
payments). 
169 See id. (follow “Using Physician Profiles” hyperlink; then scroll to “Malpractice 
Information”) (indicating that profiles include malpractice payment information 
“within the context of the physicians’ specialty”). 
170 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-9.2(a)(2)(vii) (2004); see Wayne G. Gugliemo, Shaping 
Your Profile on the Web, MED. ECON., May 7, 2001, http://www.memag.com/memag/ 
article/articleDetail.jsp?id=118082 (noting Massachusetts’ influence on Rhode Island’s 
adoption of, and content of, online physician profiles). 
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the last ten years in excess of $100,000 be reported for medical or os-
teopathic doctors; those in excess of $5,000 must be reported if the 
physician is a podiatrist.171  However, a bill was recently passed, al-
though subsequently vetoed, which would have required the disclo-
sure of all settlements for medical and osteopathic doctors, regardless 
of settlement amount.172  As opposed to Massachusetts, Florida pub-
lishes the exact settlement amount without any description of the 
claim, if the doctor’s claim history exceeds the statutory threshold.173
Idaho has an approach similar to Florida’s, but sets a higher bar.  
Under Idaho’s Patient Freedom of Information Act, settlements will 
be disclosed if:  (1) the practitioner has had five or more settlements 
in the most recent five years of continuous practice, each of which was 
$50,000 or more; or, (2) the practitioner has had more than ten such 
settlements in such five-year period regardless of the amount.174  If ei-
ther condition is met, all malpractice settlements during the most re-
cent five years of continuous practice must be disclosed, except for 
settlements that resulted only in an adjustment in the practitioner’s 
fee.  The state publishes the date and the exact amount of the settle-
ment.175
California combines the category-of-settlement-amount approach 
of Massachusetts and the threshold requirement of Idaho and Flor-
ida.176  It categorizes physicians as either high-risk or low-risk, depend-
ing on their specialty.177  The Medical Board of California will publish 
settlement information for low-risk physicians who have settled three 
or more cases within the past ten years, and for high-risk physicians 
who have settled four or more cases within the past ten years.178  The 
Medical Board of California does not publish exact settlement 
171 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.041 (LexisNexis 2001). 
172 See S.B. 1180, 2005 Leg., 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (vetoed 2005) (providing 
for disclosure in Florida of physician information); see also H.B. 1739, at lns.40-42, 2005 
Leg., 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (requiring Florida profiles to reflect all information 
reported in the National Practitioner Data Bank). 
173 See Florida’s Medical Quality Assurance Practitioner Profiling Page, 
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/mqa/Profiling/profile_search.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2005) (providing physician profile information). 
174 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-4603(o)(i) (2003). 
175 See State of Idaho—Patient Freedom of Information Act, http:// 
www.idacare.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2005) (providing malpractice and settlement his-
tory to users who select a search item, choose a profile, and scroll to malpractice and 
settlement history). 
176 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 803.1 (2003). 
177 Id. § 803.1(5)(b)(2)(A), (5)(e). 
178 Id. 
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amounts, but describes the settlement as average, below average or 
above average, and includes data about the physician’s length of prac-
tice and settlement statistics about doctors in the physician’s spe-
cialty.179
These states’ laws show two main approaches to converting a 
quantitative signal of a medical malpractice settlement into a qualita-
tive signal:  amount and frequency thresholds and categorization of 
settlement amounts.  Under my analysis, both techniques would in-
crease the amount of useful information conveyed to a future plaintiff 
or consumer, while possibly reducing the likelihood of frivolous 
claims.  According to the Rules in Part III.C, settlement information 
can provide quantitative or qualitative signals to future plaintiffs.  For 
all of the reasons discussed in Part IV.B, publishing the settlement 
amount of a medical malpractice claim alone cannot accurately signal 
the doctor’s culpability.  Consequently, disclosed settlement informa-
tion should be as qualitative as possible. 
There are a number of ways to provide qualitative signals.  
Thresholds are critical from the outset:  if the majority of suits do not 
reflect negligence or culpability, perhaps it is not useful to publish 
them.  Only those settlements that are above and beyond the average 
should be published, as they are more likely to indicate poor care 
quality.  Additionally, if the doctor’s claim history reflects significantly 
more claims than other doctors within her specialty, settlement in-
formation likely indicates greater culpability.  Thus, settlement infor-
mation would be more useful to consumers if it were published in 
context to similar claims or in conjunction with a doctor’s history in 
the context of similar practitioners. 
More could be done to provide qualitative signals.  A short de-
scription of the claim could provide more qualitative information to a 
future plaintiff.  As there are many possible causes for patient claims, a 
verbal description of the claim could be more useful than just learn-
ing about the existence of an “average” settlement.180  Regardless, an 
approach that simply publishes the actual settlement amount is clearly 
not as useful to the public, and may induce frivolous suits, because a 
potential plaintiff immediately knows what the doctor is “good for.” 
179 Id. § 803.1(b)(2)(B)(i). 
180 In the wake of the NJHCCIA, some patient safety groups acknowledged that in-
formation about “what went wrong and why” is more useful to patients than “set-
tlement patterns and behaviors.”  See Silverman, supra note 152, at 30 (relating pa-
tient advocates’ recommendation that profiles disclose a summary of the case, in 
exclusion of the amount of the settlement).   
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Medical malpractice is especially complicated because of the in-
volvement of insurers, the high stakes of personal health and safety, 
and the competing interest to encourage, rather than suppress, 
growth in the medical industry.  Generally, mandatory settlement pub-
lication, according to the model above, does not seem to further the 
goals of tort reform.  Even though comprehensive data analysis on the 
effects of sunshine reforms has yet to be completed, it is clear that 
open settlements may vary in type and thus the incentives they provide 
to future plaintiffs.  This Comment acknowledges the difficulty in 
aligning a sunshine program with litigants’ incentives, but still demon-
strates that a sunshine regime must be carefully tailored to align indi-
vidual litigants’ incentives with society’s interests by reducing incen-
tives for frivolous lawsuits while providing useful information for 
injured plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment recognizes that the scholarly debate on confiden-
tiality is disjointed because it is split between legal theorists and 
economists.  By applying economic models’ predictions of costs and 
benefits to the traditional discourse, several conclusions emerge. 
First, it might be most effective to alter litigants’ incentives rather 
than rely on third parties, such as judges or lawyers, to regulate liti-
gants’ actions.  This can be achieved by controlling the type of infor-
mation provided to potential future litigants.  Careful statutory restric-
tions on what aspects of settlement information may be published (i.e. 
controlling the “signal”) could be an efficient way to aid future plain-
tiffs while minimizing frivolous suits. 
Second, assuming that neither blanket confidentiality nor total 
openness is optimal, some degree of open settlement is probably re-
quired.  Openness is most appropriate in fields and industries that 
implicate the health and welfare of the general public; it may not be 
appropriate in fields that implicate only private concerns.  As govern-
ment administrative departments already regulate industries that pose 
significant risks to the public, it seems reasonable that regulatory 
agencies could also watch settlements involving widespread public 
hazards.  Such a regime has already begun in the medical malpractice 
area. 
Third, not all open settlements are the same.  Open settlements 
that facilitate a transfer of information about the facts of the incident 
are far more useful in deterrence and compensation.  In contrast, 
quantitative publication of settlement amounts encourages frivolous 
  
2005] QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY 475 
lawsuits, imposing costs on the public and defendants and primarily 
benefiting fraudulent plaintiffs.  Statutory restrictions are most useful 
when they prohibit the disclosure of damage awards and settlement 
amounts, without preventing access to the critical information about a 
public hazard.  Public disclosure of the qualitative information 
through the internet or watchdog organizations may be a useful com-
plement to a regulatory regime that seeks to keep the public safe. 
In sum, I have proposed that the debate over the confidentiality of 
settlements should be reoriented from the question of whether confi-
dentiality is normatively good or bad, to the question of what types of 
confidentiality best align litigants’ incentives with societal interests.  
The Rules and the reasoning in this Comment begin to frame that 
debate. 
 
